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Abstract 
Pricing commercial real estate has its foundations in present value theory. Recent improvements 
for accessing transaction data have stimulated interest in commercial property hedonic pricing 
models, the structures of which follow traditions in single-family real estate in that the implicit 
prices of property characteristics and site-specific variables represent city and national market 
conditions. Adding present value variables has become increasingly common to account for 
general market conditions. We test two hedonic pricing models; one that follows the residential 
tradition and another that departs by incorporating city-specific net operating incomes and the 
discount rates. Modeling prices in these alternative ways allows for recognition of the relative 
contributions of property, city, and capital market determinants. Empirical testing relies on a 
sample of hotel transactions from 2005–2010. The responsiveness of hotel cash flows to market 
changes is an important consideration. We find that models with property characteristics 
perform about the same as models that also include present value variables. A plausible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that implicit prices corresponding to property characteristics 
and site-specific variables appear to reflect income streams associated with city and nationwide 
economic conditions. 
 
 
 Keywords: commercial real estate, hedonic model, hotel 
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Determinants of Hotel Property Prices 
Introduction 
 A recent study by Ghysels et al. (2007) suggests that the discounted cash flow model 
might be more suitable than the traditional hedonic model in pricing commercial real estate. The 
authors also find that property and local economic factors account for only a modest portion of 
the variation in capitalizations rates. Given these results, a natural question that arises is whether 
the traditional hedonic model can be improved upon by incorporating capital market factors 
since the value of commercial real estate ex-ante should be affected both by property specific 
characteristics, and by the macroeconomic inclusive of capital market conditions at city or even 
national level. While intuitive, this question has not been explored in the previous literature to 
our knowledge. To address this question, we test a hedonic pricing model for commercial real 
estate (CRE) that generates implicit prices from property attributes together with implicit prices 
of both city market net rents and capitalization rates consistent with present value theory. Ex-
post, we find that the performance of the traditional hedonic model is similar in performance to a 
modified hedonic model which also includes capital market variables even though financial 
variables have a modest correlation at best with property attributes. It appears that the implicit 
prices of property attributes are time varying and not only capture fixed location income streams 
but also income streams associated with city and nationwide economic conditions. 
 We estimate the model parameters without the Rosen (1974) equivalent of an underlying 
utility theory for investment in differentiated CRE attributes. Instead we assume that property 
attribute coefficients represent the marginal utilities received from additional units of these 
attributes offered at unique locations in line with urban economic theory. The implicit prices thus 
serve as proxies for unobserved, endemic property net rents. Hedonic modeling for CRE has 
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closely followed the housing literature by relying on property-specific and transaction-specific 
characteristics for price prediction. Beginning with Hoag (1980), in one of earliest published 
CRE hedonic adaptations, there has been recognition that CRE transaction prices derive from 
macroeconomic and regional economic influences in addition to, and independent of, property 
fundamentals and locations. 
 A model we test uses city market net rents and capitalization rates together with property 
attributes, which allows us to examine the incremental determinants of CRE transaction prices 
across three main effects: (1) net rental for the property (2), net rental for the city market, (3) the 
city and national capital market. Accordingly, we assess the relative contributions of systematic 
(i.e., city and national) and unsystematic (i.e., property) value determinants. The econometric 
approach we use addresses colinearity and endogeneity issues that may arise as the result of 
mixing these effects within the same model. 
 The various property types that comprise the investible universe of CRE share many 
common features. Each type is subject to the same land rent conditions that determine capital and 
land contributions; CRE is similarly treated in the capital markets (Gyourko 2009). Property 
types also embody idiosyncratic characteristics. These unique features originate from endemic 
physical attributes and institutional arrangements found in specialized contracts (i.e., lease 
provisions)—the effects of which on space market rents, property prices, and securitized asset 
prices have been subjects for a large number of studies.
1
 
 We focus on the hotel property type for estimating our models by utilizing transaction 
information from U.S. markets. Hotels have a highly visible presence in cities despite only 
comprising about 10 % of the CRE universe (Florance et al. 2010 and Prudential, 2009). Among 
                                                          
1
 One topical example is Eichholtz et al. (2010) who find that office buildings with a ‘green rating’ sell at a three 
percent premium relative to identical properties, where ‘identical’ is determined from a hedonic specification 
including multiple controls. 
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the approximately 130 NAREIT member equity REITs, less than 20 own hotel portfolios. These 
facts may explain why hotel asset pricing and market behavior have not been heavily researched. 
The scarcity of hotel real estate data is another barrier. For example, only in recent years has 
NCREIF maintained a hotel index; and even now the number of properties in this index is small 
relative to other NCREIF property-specific indexes. 
 Hotel real estate valuation raises some intellectually interesting questions; the answers to 
which have possible implications for the general case of CRE investment analysis and valuation. 
The absence of long-term leases to secure income streams is the most often-cited point of 
differentiation from other CRE. This institutional arrangement provides hotel management with 
the ability to reset many room rates on a daily basis and thus offers opportunities to grow income 
in synchronization with upward movements of inflation and the market.
2
 Also, this process 
should symmetrically operate in reverse in down markets, albeit not necessarily with the same 
immediacy.
3
 Short-term rental raises controversial issues about cash flow risk (Quan et al. 2002), 
franchising effects (O’Neill and Mattila 2010), and management contributions to cash flow 
generation (Brady and Conlin 2004). Given minimal contract frictions, hotel markets provide a 
natural setting for examining the sensitivity of fixed-location income streams and asset prices to 
changes in the city and national economic conditions. 
 A final point of differentiation comes from the fact that nearly 60 % of the over 52,000 
U.S. hotels who report their operating performance to data aggregator Smith Travel Research 
(STR), and an even larger share of investment quality properties, operate with recognizable 
                                                          
2
 Hotels catering to business travelers may have forward contracts with corporations that establish room rate on an 
annual basis and sometimes for a meaningful number of room nights. Also, many hotels use online travel agents to 
which they pre-sell rooms. Hence the general statement that hotel management has the ability mark rents to market 
is compromised for some hotels. 
3
 One of the issues debated in the hotel management literature involves the process of room rate ‘discounting’ during 
down markets. See Croes and Semrad (2012) for recent evidence and literature review. 
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brands (Smith Travel Research 2012). Brand sponsors (aka franchisors) impose strict design and 
construction standards that introduce considerable homogeneity within the set of like-branded 
properties. Sponsors, such as Choice, Hilton, Hyatt, Marriott, Intercontinental, Starwood, and 
Wyndham, require property owners to maintain uniform quality standards during franchise 
contract periods. Failure to maintain these standards may result in license termination. Brand 
standards therefore provide ‘built-in’ quality controls across properties of the same brand and 
same market segment that are similar in nature to houses within the same neighborhood, but in 
contrast to other CRE property types. Brands from different sponsors tend to cluster into 
competitive national and city markets which results in similar physical and operational features 
across brands within the same market segment or ‘chain scales’.4 This clustering suggests that 
hotels in the same market segment, although differentiated by brand, serve as close substitutes to 
one another. 
 
Rationalization for an Alternative Approach 
 Location fixity, durability, and the absence of continuous trading place a greater 
importance on modeling real estate prices relative to traded financial assets and commodities. 
Because so much attention has been directed to real estate valuation model development, it is not 
surprising that different views have emerged over the conceptual and technical matters related to 
model construction. Importantly, an imaginary line delineates the border between relative and 
absolute modeling approaches for real estate valuation as it does in corporate valuation 
(Damodaran 2002). 
                                                          
4
 STR defines these market segments into collections of brands know as chain scales. The six chain scales are 
luxury, upper-upscale, upscale, upper-midscale, midscale, and economy. 
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 Without the benefit of observable market rents, the pricing of owner-occupied housing 
relies on relative valuations.
5
 Present value models were almost exclusively used for CRE 
valuation until recent decades when new and improved transaction data bases sparked interest in 
hedonic and repeat-sale model forms borrowed from residential property valuation and price 
indexing. The portability of housing hedonics to CRE is far from direct. Fewer comparable 
transactions typically occur in the CRE markets per period than in housing markets. The 
homogeneity of houses is known to be greater than most types of commercial properties hence 
CRE hedonic valuations require additional controls to conform to the law of one price. 
Importantly, the conceptual foundations of buyer and seller motivations in housing compared to 
CRE hedonic valuations depart in an economically significant way despite sharing urban 
economics principles. 
 Hedonic theory enhanced by Rosen (1974) Epple (1987), and Lancaster (1966) from 
early applications by Court (1939) and Griliches (1961, 1971) assumes that the prices of 
differentiated consumer products derive from the implicit prices of the attribute collections that 
comprise these products. Obviously no transactions occur for any one attribute (e.g., bedrooms in 
houses) so the prices of characteristics are never independently observed. Aggregate housing 
demand and supply ultimately determine attribute marginal contributions to aggregate prices. 
The demand and supply drivers for CRE (e.g., CBD location) may differ in meaningful ways 
from the determinants of home prices (e.g., proximity to good schools not likely a factor in CRE 
investment). 
                                                          
5
 Muth (1960) developed a theory of housing demand based on the service flows received by occupants. BOne unit 
of housing service is defined as that quantity of service yielded by one unit of housing stock per unit of time. The 
price per unit of housing service, or rent, is the price paid by consumers for the flow of services from one standard 
house peer unit of time (pp. 32–33).^ The value of a house then becomes the present value of the flow of services 
net of expenses. Given the difficulty of converting and building pro forma of housing service flows in terms of 
monetary rental flows paid by consuming owner occupants (i.e., price time quantity of housing services), valuation 
models based on financial economics principles never emerged. Hedonic models serve to standardize units of 
housing services. 
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 In Rosen (1974) two-stage model, consumer demand determinants, such as income, are 
important for estimating implicit prices—the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for each 
attribute. The coefficient estimates from CRE hedonic models may be interpreted in a similar 
way to marginal utilities investors receive from additional units of attributes in much the same 
way as housing attribute implicit prices are interpreted by consumers. However, an investor 
utility theory for heterogeneous investment properties and their attributes is not well developed. 
The literature on heterogeneous buyer behavior (Bokhari and Geltner 2011), seller behavior 
(Haurin et al. 2010), and investor sentiment (Clayton et al. 2009) is emerging, but nascent at 
present. Because investors achieve wealth maximization objectives by obtaining rights to future 
net rents, it is reasonable to assume that investors achieve these objectives through ownership of 
CRE attributes and thus the aggregation of attribute implicit prices correspond to total net rents. 
The question we pursue here is whether or not the implicit prices of property characteristics and 
site-specific variables incorporate city and national market conditions believed to influence CRE 
prices or do other unique independent variables needed to be included to account for these 
influences. Our results indicate that city and national market conditioning variables add little to 
the explanatory power of the CRE hedonic model. 
 The CRE pricing model we test uniquely incorporates city net rent and capital market 
pricing linked to national net rents together with a typical set of property attributes that 
conceptually relate to property-specific net rents. Present value and urban economic theories 
taken together suggest that general levels of rents and capitalization rates of cities where 
properties are located, relative properties locations within cities, and the physical characteristics 
of the property determine the asset prices. Endogeneity arises in the hedonic model we test as the 
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result of introducing city net rents so we estimate model parameters using two-stage least squares 
in which net rent and price are endogenous. 
 We find that including only property and site-specific characteristics in the hedonic 
model following the residential modeling convention provides about the same explanatory power 
as a model that combines property, city income, and capital market characteristics. Both models 
explain between 75 and 80% of the variation in hotel asset prices after controlling for transaction 
effects, brand/quality, and time trend. We conclude that the implicit prices of the property-
specific attributes absorb changes in city and national market conditions over time since the 
model parameters are estimated with prices that continuously change with these conditions. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. “Related Literature” contains a 
review of literature—its relevance and findings. In “Model” we present a model that sets up our 
empirical testing of hedonic models. “Research Design and Method” describes the data and 
explains variable construction. The methodology and econometric issues also are discussed in 
this section. “Results” presents results from the analysis of hotel transaction data. Concluding 
remarks appear in the final section. 
 
Related Literature 
 Our interests in the related literature first lie with the hedonic modeling approaches 
generally followed for pricing single-family homes and CRE; and secondarily with 
advancements in explaining variation in hotel property prices. With respect to CRE adaptations, 
it has become increasingly clear that treating CRE as a composite asset class introduces 
aggregation bias—macro parameters deviating from the averages of the component micro 
parameters (Theil 1954). Differences in risk and return relationships among various property 
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types are demonstrated in diversification studies (Fisher and Liang 2000 and Cheng and Roulac 
2007). Other studies show marked differences across property types in the ability of 
capitalization rates to predict future returns (Plazzi et al. 2010), and patterns of construction 
cycles as well as correlations with the business cycle (Wheaton 1999). This evidence suggests 
that different economic determinants of prices and returns associated with different CRE 
property types justify customized valuation model development for major property types. 
 By comparison, the volume of hedonic pricing research in single-family housing far 
exceeds the number of similar studies for CRE property types. Given the absence of both 
observable market rents and a wealth maximizing investment perspective, housing models 
usually do not blend present value and urban economic theory. Of the housing studies that rely 
on present value concepts, Meese and Wallace (1994) find that modeled values may deviate from 
observed house prices in the short run. 
 Since the early 1980s, advancements in CRE hedonic pricing occurred to the extent that 
models have been applied to examine a wide variety of practical issues including apartment age 
restrictions (Guntermann and Moon 2002), rent concessions (Sirmans et al. 1990), and 
technological change (Colwell and Ramsland 2003) to cite a few. Dermisi and McDonald (2010) 
and Wiley and Wyman (2012) provide updated detailed reviews of this literature. Beginning with 
Hoag (1980), CRE hedonic models began incorporating economic measures, such as national 
employment and GDP, to control for differences in macroeconomic conditions at the times of 
sales. These variables enter hedonic equations without direct links to asset pricing theory and, 
except for Lockwood and Rutherford (1996) who use LISREL to correct for econometric 
problems; they also may introduce multi-colinearity problems resulting from mixing national and 
local economic determinants within the same model. The introduction of market-wide controls is 
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not always beneficial. Dermisi and McDonald (2010), for example, include both the office 
property and market vacancy rate in their hedonic model. Property vacancy is statistically 
significant while market vacancy is insignificant leading to the conclusion that “… investors are 
more inclined to acquire properties due to their specific characteristics and occupancy level 
rather than the overall market condition (p.13).” 
 For hotel properties, Corgel (1997, 2007) reports hedonic results with disaggregate 
transaction data using similar sets of property and location characteristics and measures of local 
market economic strength, such as ZIP or county employment and income.
6
 These semi-log 
regressions explain large percentages of variation in sale price. Most property and all local 
market economic variables are correctly signed and statistically significant. None of the 
equations include either city NOI or capital market effects, although local economic variables 
proxy with error for local area NOI. Recently, Blal and Graf (2013) estimate a model using over 
10,000 hotel sales and a set of conditioning variables and explanatory power (i.e.,        ) 
not much different than earlier studies. They find that hotels with property characteristics 
measurably different from the norm sell at discounts. Another recent working paper (Beracha et 
al. 2013) follows an approach with findings similar to ours in that market-wide variables tend to 
be statistically significant in the hedonic model but add little to the overall explanatory power. 
 Explaining variation in property capitalization rates represents an alternative path to 
understanding CRE asset market pricing. Nearly all of these studies use aggregate, appraisal-
based capitalization rate data. Sivitanidou and Sivtanides (1999) and Jud and Winkler (1995), for 
example, estimate equations with transaction-generated capitalization rates, but use periodic 
averages that do not allow for property-level quality controls. In contrast, McDonald and 
                                                          
6
 O’Neill (2004) estimates a hedonic price equation for hotels that includes both hotel financial performance 
variables and local market controls, but he only reports results for financial performance variables. 
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Dermisi (2008, 2009) build a capitalization rate models with disaggregated transaction data so 
that local economic, national economic, and property characteristics appear in the same model. 
They find that local and national economic forces effect risk-free rates, risk premiums, and rental 
growth run (i.e., Gordon Growth model components) through the capitalization rate. A review in 
Chaney and M. Hoesli (2012) traces this literature from the late 1980s to present and discusses 
its shortcomings. 
 To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the first to test a hedonic model for 
explaining variation in CRE prices rooted in both urban economic and present value theories 
while recognizing the econometric problems of estimating parameters of such a model. This 
approach allows us to separate the effects of property fundamentals, city markets, and the macro-
level capital market. Ghysels et al. (2007) conclude that … “commercial real estate prices are 
better modeled as financial assets and that the discounted rent model might be more suitable than 
traditional hedonic models, at least at the aggregate level (p. 472–3),” They report that less than 
one-third of the variation in capitalization rates is explained by property and local economic 
variables. Our results give credence to traditional hedonic pricing of CRE, but do not directly 
contrast hedonic and DCF predictions. We report that present value model components add little 
in a hedonic framework. 
 
Model 
 Discounting future net rents to generate current present values is deeply rooted in 
financial economic theory as adapted for CRE valuation. The basic form of the model is 
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where      is the net operating income at the end of period t and r is the risk-adjusted discount 
rate. Following McDonald (2005) and multiplying by      , gives 
                                                                                        
 Rewriting this equation gives, 
                                                                                            
where          
 The period-zero capitalization rate,   , comes from solving Eq. (3), as follows 
                                                                                 
 The expression for    can be written in the form below assuming the terminal 
capitalization rate equals the initial capitalization rate and the Gordon Growth Model takes a 
general form with percent change in value as follows 
                                                                                
 We present      as the composite of systematic effects from the local market and 
idiosyncratic property-specific effects. Thus, 
                                                                      
 where       and       represent the NOIs of the local market and individual property, 
respectively. Each NOI has endemic rent (i.e.,    and   ) and expense (i.e.,    and   ) 
components. 
 Unobservable property      
  is estimated from location and physical property attributes, 
  , as 
     
                                                                                                       
 The final expression for    becomes 
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 Holding to the assumption that the terminal capitalization rate equals the initial 
capitalization rate the denominator of Eq. (8) may be represented by the discount rate, r. All of 
the parameters in Eq. (8) are estimated using a hedonic specification in which the local market 
NOI effect is represented, the city rate for present valuing captures both national capital market 
influences and local risk premiums, property NOI effect is included, and trend and transaction 
specific characteristics are controlled for through the time-series and other dummy variables, 
     . 
            
           
                                                        
 Because the present value model structure embedded in Eq. (9) is non-linear we take the 
natural logs of both       and   . The final form is, 
           
             
                                                 
 Econometric issues encountered when estimating Eq. (10) arise from the possibility that 
      is correlated with   . We discuss this endogeneity problem in a subsequent section. 
 
Research Design and Method 
Data 
 The hotel data primarily come from Real Capital Analytics (RCA). This firm collects 
transaction prices and associated property characteristics for U.S. commercial property sales 
greater than $2.5 million. The sample period begins in January 2005 and ends in December 2010. 
Data from CoStar, PKF Hospitality Research, and STR augment the RCA data. The subsequent 
section on variable construction discusses the various uses of these supplemental databases. 
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Variable Construction 
 The property characteristics appearing on the right side of our hedonic equations account 
for the variation in selling prices of a unique property type although some are common to other 
CRE models. We include the effective age (EA)—calculated as the year of sale subtracted from 
the year of renovation, the number of rooms (RM), a landmark property dummy (DLAND) 
which equals one if the hotel is designated as a historical landmark and zero otherwise. Two 
location dummies also enter the equations. The first of these variables captures whether the hotel 
is located next to water (DH2O) such as beachfront property while the second one denotes a 
CBD hotel location (DCBD). We also include a dummy to indicate expected and meaningful 
(i.e., in terms of scale) renovations associated with the sale event (DRENO). 
 Transaction-specific effects may influence hotel sale prices so controls appear in the 
equations for REIT hotel buyers (DREIT), a positive clientele effect mentioned in financial press 
reports during the period, and if individual hotels changed ownership as part of portfolio 
transactions (DPORT).
7
 The sign on the DPORT coefficient is ambiguous because the 
composition of the portfolio may result in a single property’s price being greater than or less than 
the price if the hotel was sold independent of other assets. 
 Based on economic institution and findings in the real estate asset pricing literature, we 
expect an inverse relationship between effective age and transaction prices of hotels. Positive 
relationships are presumed between selling prices and the number of rooms, landmark 
designation, locations near water and in the CBDs, planned hotel renovations, and REIT buyers. 
 To measure difficult to observe hotel attributes such as amenity and service quality, a 
market segment dummy variable series is used for differentiation of lower from higher quality 
                                                          
7
 The recorded price for a property sold as part of a portfolio is the price reported to RCA. Sometimes RCA make an 
allocation of the portfolio price to each property. 
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hotels. These are: luxury (LUX), upper upscale hotels (UUPS), upscale hotels (UPS), upper 
midscale hotels (UMID), midscale hotels (MID), and economy (ECO) hotel market segments 
(i.e., chain scales).
8
 We expect the hotel prices to increase with hotel quality. As discussed in the 
introduction, brand standards result in property homogeneity and brands clustered within the 
chain scales also are of similar quality. 
 The extent of economic activity in the immediate surrounding area of the sold hotels may 
not be adequately controlled for by the variables discussed above. Hence, the daytime 
employment base (i.e., number of employees) within a three mile radius of the hotel location was 
collected from CoStar and introduced into the hedonic equation (NEMP). The higher the daytime 
employment base, the greater the potential demand for hotel rooms and logically higher selling 
prices. A dummy variables series starting in 2006 (T06) and ending in 2010 (T10) accounts for 
time trend.
9
 
 City discount rates come from Real Estate Research Corporation. A city NOI variable is 
constructed using PKF and STR total revenue and expense ratio data during each year. We adjust 
revenue by one minus the expense ratio of properties’ respective market segment to link the city 
NOI to each property. The variable construction equation is as follows, 
               
                                                                    
 where       is the city NOI assigned to property i in period t,          
  is the city total 
revenue in period t, and    is the operating ratio for the applicable chain sale for property i in 
period t. 
  
                                                          
8
 Market segments are defined using STR classification chain scale system. This system is detailed in a subsequent 
section. The luxury hotel dummy is the omitted variable. 
9
 The 2005 dummy is the omitted variable. 
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Results 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 623 hotel real estate sales that 
transacted in the U.S. from 2005 through 2010. As shown in Panel A, the sample includes both 
large (i.e.,           ) and small hotels (i.e.,         ). The NOIs and discount rates 
are for the city in which the transaction was completed. Statistics for property characteristics and 
transaction-specific variables appear in Panel B. Note that the transactions are spread across the 
six STR chain scales; all dummy variables are well distributed; and that the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis and recession lowered transaction volume. 
Hedonic Estimates 
 Our first set of implicit price estimates comes from running the data through the standard 
hedonic model with property attributes, transaction characteristics, and present value model 
variables—NOIs and discount rates. Table 2 presents the results from estimating three alternative 
models. As is often the case in single-family and CRE hedonic estimations the semi-log 
functional form provides the best fit of the data. Model I includes property characteristics, 
immediate surrounding area effects, transaction-specific measures, and time dummies. This 
conventional hedonic specification explains nearly 76 % of the variation in hotel transaction 
prices. All variables have the expected signs and only effective age squared and two of the time 
dummies have coefficients that are not significant at the 0.10 level or better. In Model II, we 
remove the property characteristics and immediate area measures and introduce the logs of the 
NOI and discount rate while continuing to keep in place the controls for transaction effects and 
time trend. Only city NOI and the REIT buyer dummy are statistically significant in this 
regression. Together the financial variables and controls account for less than 40 % of the 
variation in hotel transaction prices. 
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 Model III mixes the traditional hedonic variables with financial variables. Interestingly, 
the coefficient vector of traditional hedonic variables differs only slightly from the Model I 
vector. The sizes and t-statistics of city NOI and discount rate, however, are markedly different 
in this specification relative to Model II. The coefficient and t-statistic of city NOI, while 
remaining correctly signed, measurably decline in size. Also, the discount rate becomes negative 
consistent with theory and statistically significant. Notwithstanding, the explanatory power of 
this model is only slightly improved over the standard hedonic model as shown by the    of 
0.7747 compared to 0.7594. We interpret the results from this estimation as an indication that 
modeling hotel property prices may be relatively unaffected by introducing market effects in the 
same equation with property and area-specific variables as evidenced by the stability of the 
coefficient vector and lack of    enhancement. We also suspect that possible econometric issues 
from mixing these variables within the same model may not be generating the correct parameter 
estimates and regression statistics. 
 With respect to the econometric issues, we have unanswered questions about correlations 
among regressors in these models, especially in Model III. First-order correlation coefficients 
and variance inflation factors appear in Table 3. The correlation between NOI and NEMP 
appears high, yet not alarmingly so, and the variance inflation factors for    and     approach 
the rule-of-thumb critical level of 10.0 (Kennedy 2003, p.213). As a test, we remove    and      
from Model III; this action results in very minor effects. In summary, the statistics presented in 
Table 3 do not raise meaningful concerns regarding the independence among the regressors, 
hence we conclude that our models do not violate the linear independence assumption. 
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Endogeneity and 2-Stage LS Estimation 
 In Eq. (9) restated below, hotel prices are modeled as a function of city NOI (     ), 
property specific characteristics (  ), city discount rate (  ), time trend of price changes (  ), and 
transaction-specific price determinants,   . 
            
           
                           
 While we show that the variables representing these determinants are not highly 
correlated and OLS generates reasonable parameter estimates and high although not extremely 
high R-squares, aggregate city NOI likely will not capture all the effects of market influences on 
hotel property prices. Thus, omitted regressors may be correlated with included regressors and 
with the error term,   . This observation suggests that       is endogenous and its coefficient, 
  , is inconsistent. We address the potential endogeniety problem in Model III by re-estimating 
Eq. (9) using the control-function approach that involves introducing instruments in a first-stage 
NOI regression. The changes in the selected instrumental variable(s) must be associated with 
changes in NOI, but not associated with changes in regressors and   , except through NOI. 
 Two instrumental variables enter the first-stage regression. To account for possible 
differences in city hotel demand mix (i.e., business group, and transient), we include a dummy 
variable (DGATE) to reflect whether the sold hotel is located in a gateway city. Cities that we 
define as gateway cities include Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, Miami, San 
Francisco, and Washington DC. Table 3 shows the first-order correlation coefficient between 
DGATE and NOI equals 0.45. This result is not surprising since both DGATE and NOI represent 
citywide effects. The other instrument is the city unemployment rate (UEMPR), a variable that 
has not appeared in hotel asset pricing equations presented in the literature, but may influence 
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city NOI through the labor expense line. Equation (12) presents the first-stage estimating 
equation. 
                                                                     
 In the first-stage estimation both instruments are correctly signed, but only the DGATE 
coefficient is statistically significant (       ). Table 4 presents the second stage results from 
data for the sample of 623 U.S. hotel sales. Comparing these results to those reported in Table 2 
for Model III, most coefficients are nearly the same magnitudes and significance levels. The 
estimated NOI coefficient of 0.3124 is larger from this analysis versus 0.1702 from OLS which 
is consistent with our presumption of endogeniety bias. The coefficient of NEMP becomes 
smaller with the more consistent estimation of NOI. As shown in Table 3, these measures have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.46 attributable to the fact that the three mile radius from the hotel 
location lies within city boundaries. Unexpectedly, the coefficient for the discount rate becomes 
statistically insignificant while maintaining the theoretically correct negative sign. Finally, the R-
squared (i.e., 0.7711 and 0.7747) and root mean square error (i.e., 0.5457 and 0.5418) remain 
virtually the same in the 2SLS run relative to OLS. 
 
 
Variation in Implicit Prices 
 The weak explanatory power of city and capital market variables may be because of any 
one or a combination of alternative explanations. First, as Dermisi and McDonald (2010) 
contend CRE buyers and sellers may transact based on idiosyncratic property features and 
performance measures without much recognition of city and national markets conditions. This 
position recognizes that ‘good’ properties can command high prices in poor markets and ‘bad’ 
properties low prices in good markets. Second, the implicit prices of property-specific variables 
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absorb, and move in concert with, general market conditions as do the prices of composite good. 
The counter argument would be that the estimated implicit prices only reflect differences in the 
quantities and qualities of the CRE that transacted during a particular period, given that the 
composition of properties sold can be quite different from period to period. 
 Table 5 presents the range of implicit prices for most important property-specific 
variables in our single-stage regression. These estimates come from running the regressions only 
with transaction information from each year in during the sample period, 2005 through 2010. 
Some of the ranges are fairly broad while others narrow. Unfortunately we are unable to 
determine whether periodic differences in these implicit prices originate from sample 
composition differences or changes in underlying market conditions from 2005 through 2010. 
 
Robustness Check – Results by Chain Scale 
 The universe of approximately 52,000 hotels and nearly 5,000,000 rooms assembled by 
data aggregator STR is widely viewed as ‘the U.S. hotel industry’. This assemblage excludes 
properties with fewer than 20 rooms and includes most hotels with brand affiliations and many 
independent hotels inside the U.S. boundaries. The STR universe is organized into six chain 
scale divisions each consisting of branded hotels of similar quality and ADR plus a large 
independent hotel category. The number (percent) of hotels in each chain scale is as follows 
(Smith Travel Research 2012): 
 Luxury – 307 (0.6 %), examples include Ritz-Carlton and Four Seasons. 
 Upper Upscale – 1,513 (2.9 %), examples include Hyatt and Westin. 
 Upscale – 3,760 (7.2 %), examples include Hilton Garden Inn and Hotel Indigo. 
 Upper Midscale – 8,776 (16.8 %), examples include Hampton Inn and Fairfield Inn. 
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 Midscale – 5,336 (10.2 %), examples include Quality Inn and Red Lion. 
 Economy – 10,363 (19.9 %), examples include Motel 6 and Microtel Inn. 
 Independent – 22,098 (42.4 %). 
 These data reveal that the hotel industry is not an evenly distributed collection of 
operating businesses. Many more U.S. hotels operate in the economy segment than other chain 
scales. Also, a large number of independent hotels would logically fall into the economy segment 
if classified according to chain scales along price and quality lines. To conduct robustness checks 
on our results from analyzing aggregate data we disaggregate the hotels in our sample into chain 
scales and re-estimate the price equations. Because of sample size limitations we combine the six 
chain scales into three classifications—luxury and upper upscale (     ), upscale and upper 
midscale (     ), and midscale and economy (     ). Independent hotels in the sample 
are assigned to a chain scale by examining their room size and amenities. 
 Results from re-estimating the hedonic pricing models (i.e., single and two stages) for the 
three hotel market segment classifications appear in Table 6 through Table 8. Focusing on the 
2SLS estimates, the coefficient sizes and significance along with regression statistics exhibit 
several dissimilarities across the four sets of equations – full sample (Table 4), luxury/upper 
upscale (Table 6), upscale/upper midscale (Table 7), and midscale/economy (Table 8). A 
bulleted summary of the differences is as follows: 
Full Sample Compared to Luxury/Upper Upscale 
 The R-squared is somewhat lower for this sub-sample (i.e., 0.5860 vs. 0.7711).  
 Neither of the present value variable coefficients are significant. 
 Surprisingly, age, CBD location, and landmark status are not important for explaining 
variation in high-end hotel property prices.  
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 Only the number of rooms and water location have significant coefficients among the 
property characteristics.  
 Not surprisingly, REIT buyers are important for price determination and the portfolio 
variable coefficient is not significant in the sub-sample regression. Higher-end hotels 
have attracted REIT buyers, but generally sell in one-off transactions. 
Full Sample Compared to Upscale/Upper Midscale 
 The R-squared is somewhat lower for this sub-sample (i.e., 0.5829 vs. 0.7711).  
 Both present value variable coefficients are significant.  
 The remaining coefficient vector in this sub-sample closely aligns with that of the full 
sample. 
Full Sample Compared to Midscale/Economy 
 The R-squared is noticeably lower for this sub-sample (i.e., 0.5361 vs. 0.7711).  
 The NOI variable coefficient is insignificant for this sub-sample, but the discount rate 
coefficient is insignificant. 
 Variable coefficients that relate more to higher-price hotels are not significant in this 
regression involving lower-price hotel transaction information. These are; CBD location, 
landmark, and water proximity.  
 The coefficient on the REIT buyer variable is unexpectedly significant. 
 Across chain scale regressions the results for estimated coefficients for non-property 
variables—NOI and r—show considerable inconsistency. Many of the estimates for the property-
and area-specific variables can be explained by intuition. The robustness check generally 
validates the use of traditional hedonic approaches to hotel real estate pricing, but does not lend 
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much support for including non-property specific variables among regressors. Notably, the same 
cautions about aggregation bias across CRE property type pricing models applies to different 
hotel quality strata. Specifically, the vector of explanatory variables introduced to predict high-
price hotels will likely not work best for hotels in the mid-price and low price chain scales. 
Conclusion: Property, City, and National Market Pricing Effects 
 Hedonic studies of commercial real estate pricing that report the relative importance of 
property characteristics (i.e., physical and location), local market economics, and national 
financial conditions have focused on accounting for variations in both property prices and 
capitalization rates. These studies offer conflicting conclusions. Sivitanidou and Sivtanides 
(1999) and McDonald and Dermisi (2008), for example, find that property attributes and local 
economics are the most important drivers of capitalization rate variation. In contrast, Ghysels et 
al. (2007) and Chervachidze and Wheaton (2013) place the majority of weight on 
macroeconomic conditions. Recently Dermisi and McDonald (2010), from an office property 
hedonic pricing study, conclude that investors are more inclined to acquire properties due to their 
specific characteristics and not general market conditions. 
 The hotel transaction price data we analyze are suited for answering the question because 
of the absence of lease frictions that would impede the incorporation of local and national 
economic effects into prices. Our tests of a model that includes local market net rents and 
capitalization rates together with property attributes allows us to estimate and differentiate 
among a diverse set of hotel transaction price determinants. We organize potential determinants 
of hotel prices along the lines of the following three main effects: (1) property net rental (i.e., 
property characteristic proxies), (2) city market net rental, (3) the city and national capital market 
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allows us to access the relative contributions of systematic (i.e., city and national) and 
unsystematic (i.e., property) value determinants. 
 We show that in a conceptual valuation modeling context that variation in hotel prices 
should be explained by systematic economic factors in the city and nation as well as property 
specific attributes that fundamentally relate to cash flow generation. This is analogous to 
modeling stock returns of a particular company as a function of an overall market effect, an 
industry effect, and an idiosyncratic factor associated with the firm. In this context, academic 
debates regarding the relative importance of property and macroeconomic forces on property 
values seem less meaningful. 
 Our empirical analysis does not support the inclusion of variables measuring city and 
national market effects. These variables add little to the explanatory power of the hedonic model. 
Either Dermisi and McDonald (2010) are correct in their assertion that investors largely ignore 
broader market indicators in favor of property-specific characteristics and financial performance 
or the implicit prices of endemic property attributes embody the strength of city and national 
markets. We report that the implicit prices of property attributes vary sometimes substantially 
during our study period, but we are not able to separate out the effects of different quantities and 
qualities of sold properties during each year from the movements in markets from year to year. 
Future research may answer this question.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for hotel property transaction sample. 
Panel A — Statistics for Selected Continuous Variables 
Variable Symbol N Mean   Minimum Maximum 
Sale price P 623 $31.3M $55.1M $1.6M $575.0M 
Number of rooms RM 623 184 158 21 1348 
3M number of employees NEMP 623 6013 12518 17 54402 
Effective age EA 623 15 20 1 113 
City NOI NOIC 623 $574535 $708,127 $30,167 $5,251,023 
Capitalization rate C 623 8.47% 0.06 % 5.60 % 9.70 % 
Panel B — Statistics by Categorical Variables 
   Sale Price   
Category Symbol N Mean   Minimum Maximum 
Market Segment 
   Luxury 
   Upper upscale 
   Upscale 
   Upper midscale 
   Midscale 
   Economy 
 
LUX 
UUPS 
UPS 
UMID 
MID 
ECO 
 
28 
112 
175 
79 
134 
95 
 
$105M 
$79.9M 
$25.4M 
$14.8M 
$11.1M 
$5.5M 
 
$111.1M 
$88.3M 
$21.7M 
$19.5M 
$11.8M 
$4.4M 
 
$8M 
$5.1M 
$2.9M 
$2.8M 
$2.5M 
$1.6M 
 
$575M 
$440M 
$123M 
$130M 
$73M 
$34M 
CBD Location=1 
CBD location=0 
DCBD 
 
153 
470 
$70.3M 
$18.6M 
$81.7M 
$34.8M 
$2M 
$1.6M 
$440M 
$575M 
REIT Buyer=1 
REIT Buyer=0 
DREIT 
 
156 
467 
$37.7M 
$29.2M 
$46.3M 
$57.6M 
$1.7M 
$1.6M 
$440M 
$575M 
Landmark=1 
Landmark=0 
DLAND 
 
27 
596 
$90.8M 
$28.6M 
$115M 
$49.3M 
$6.75M 
$1.6M 
$440M 
$575M 
Water access=1 
Water access=0 
DH2O 80 
543 
$59.3M 
$27.2M 
$91.2M 
$46.2M 
$2.5M 
$1.6M 
$575M 
$440M 
Gateway City=1 
Gateway City=0 
DGATE 
 
195 
428 
$44.6M 
$25.3M 
$70.9M 
$45M 
$2M 
$1.6M 
$440M 
$575M 
Renovated=1 
Renovated=0 
DRENO 
 
81 
842 
$52.6M 
$28.1M 
$57.4M 
$54.1M 
$1.6M 
$1.7M 
$300M 
$575M 
Portfolio sale=1 
Portfolio sale=2 
DPORT 146 
477 
$23M 
$33.9M 
$22.3M 
$61.6M 
$1.7M 
$1.6M 
$145M 
$575M 
Year of Sale 
   2005 
   2006 
   2007 
   2008 
   2009 
   2010 
 
T05 
T06 
T07 
T08 
T09 
T10 
 
155 
100 
179 
108 
37 
84 
 
$30.1M 
$42.7M 
$27.3M 
$25.4M 
$21.8M 
$39.6M 
 
$63.9M 
$69.1M 
$56.3M 
$43.2M 
$29M 
$39.1M 
 
$2.8M 
$2.5M 
$1.6M 
$2.5M 
$1.6M 
$2M 
 
$424M 
$440M 
$575M 
$367M 
$123M 
$166M 
 Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 623 hotel real estate sales 
in the U.S. that occurred from 2005 through 2010. 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, 
and Smith Travel Research. 
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Table 2. One-stage OLS results, all hotels.  
Model  I II III IV 
Dependent variable  ln(P) ln(P) ln(P) ln(P) 
Right-side variable label Name Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
ln(NOIC) City NOI     0.4653* 15.51 0.1358* 4.10 
ln(C) Capitalization Rate     −0.9430* −21.33 −0.5269* −7.70 
RM Number of Rooms 186689* 16.12 0.0024* 13.81   0.0007* 2.43 
   Effective Age at Date of Sale 17068 0.08 −0.0084* −2.46   −0.0087* −2.67 
    Effective Age Squared −2563 −1.02 0.0001 1.19   0.0001 1.56 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees 34072* 7.78 0.0006* 8.43   0.0004* 6.47 
DCBD CBD Location −3466718 −0.75 0.2068* 2.91   0.2978* 4.33 
DGATE Gateway City 8297052* 2.62 0.2970* 6.10   0.2149* 4.10 
DLAND Landmark Hotel 2.53e+07* 3.38 0.2546* 2.20   0.3278* 2.99 
DH2O Water Location 1.73e+07* 3.9 0.3837* 5.62   0.4088* 6.33 
DRENO Recently Renovated −1.09e+07* −2.36 0.1198* 1.68   0.0882 1.631 
UUPS Upper Upscale Chain Scale −3.70e+07* −4.77 −0.4398* −3.69   −0.3714* −3.24 
UPS Upscale Chain Scale −5.30e+07* −6.81 −0.8254* −6.89   −0.6617* −5.68 
UMID Upper Midscale Chain Scale −6.05e+07* −7.32 −1.2208* −9.59   −0.9675* −7.42 
MID Midscale Chain Scale −5.35e+07* −6.63 −1.3579* −10.93   −1.0042* −7.75 
ECO Economy Chain Scale −5.69e+07* −6.89 −1.7908* −14.09   −1.3911* −10.51 
DREIT REIT Buyer 8681458* 2.20 0.3847* 6.34 0.4124* 5.84 0.3489* 6.07 
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Model  I II III IV 
Dependent variable  ln(P) ln(P) ln(P) ln(P) 
Right-side variable label Name Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
DPORT Portfolio Sale −1052124 −0.29 0.1389* 2.46 0.0769 1.15 0.1268* 2.37 
T06 1=Sold in 2006 7043087 1.43 0.2565* 3.37 −0.0046 −0.05 0.1459* 1.99 
T07 1=Sold in 2007 7096943 1.62 0.2600* 3.86 −0.1960* −2.40 0.1335* 2.04 
T08 1=Sold in 2008 2641751 0.54 0.2024* 2.71 −1398 −1.53 0.1299* 1.81 
T09 1=Sold in 2009 −6480796 −0.96 0.0079* 0.08 0.3270* −2.56 −0.0739 −0.75 
T10 1=Sold in 2010 −5237125 −0.96 0.0835 1.00 −2854 −2.75 −0.1393* −1.67 
  Constant 3.15e+07* 3.44 16.53* 117.22 15.44* 220.17 16.32* 114.42 
      
      Adj. 
   RMSE 
  
0.5898 
3.5e+07 
 
 
 
 
0.7731 
0.5437 
 
 
 
 
0.6508 
0.6746 
 
 
 
 
0.7975 
0.5136 
 
 
 
 
 Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, and present value variables on hotel 
transaction prices with alternative functional forms. 
*Significant at 0.10 or better. 
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Table 3. Correlations and elasticity estimates 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix—Selected Variables in All Hotels Regressions 
Variable P NOI C RM EA NEMP DCB
D 
DGATE DREIT DLAN
D 
DH20 DREN
O 
DPOR
T 
UUP
S 
UPS UMI
D 
MID ECO 
P 1                  
NOIC 0.45 1                 
C −0.35 0.20 1                
RM 0.66 0.26 −0.57 1               
EA −0.02 0.07 0.17 −0.06 1              
NEMP 0.35 0.46 −0.03 0.09 0.09 1             
DCBD 0.40 0.28 −0.14 0.32 0.32 0.6 1            
DGATE 0.21 0.45 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.37 0.25 1           
DREIT 0.07 0.08 −0.15 −0.07 −0.01 0.03 0.07 −0.01 1          
DLAND 0.23 0.09 −0.05 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.14 0.01 1         
DH20 0.20 0.06 −0.03 0.18 0.18 −0.03 0.03 −0.04 −0.07 −0.01 1        
DRENO 0.14 0.09 −0.18 0.26 0.26 0.01 0.12 0.01 −0.05 0.03 0.12 1       
DPORT −0.08 0.01 −0.04 −0.12 −0.12 −0.05 −0.10 −0.02 0.28 −0.06 −0.08 −0.11 1      
UUPS 0.41 0.27 −0.36 0.53 −0.04 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.34 −0.05 1     
UPS −0.06 0.13 −0.08 −0.09 −0.16 −0.04 −0.04 −0.01 0.30 −0.02 0.06 −0.10 0.24 −0.29 1    
UMID −0.11 −0.16 −0.01 −0.05 0.06 0.02 −0.07 −0.04 −0.19 −0.01 −0.04 −0.05 −0.18 −0.18 −0.23 1   
MID −0.19 −0.25 0.17 −0.02 −0.13 −0.05 −0.17 −0.09 0.02 −0.11 −0.12 −0.17 0.06 −0.25 −0.32 −0.20 1  
ECO −0.20 −0.18 0.34 −0.19 0.19 −0.05 −0.05 0.01 −0.22 −0.04 −0.06 −0.07 −0.10 −0.19 −0.27 −0.16 −0.22 1 
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Variable VIF Variable VIF               
   9.52 DCBD 2.05               
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    9.28 T10 1.91               
DMID 6.57 lnC 1.90               
UPS 6.43 T08 1.74               
ECO 5.25 T06 1.70               
lnNOIC 4.87 DREIT 1.46               
UUPS 4.54 T09 1.29               
RM 4.49 DRENO 1.21               
UMID 4.37 DPORT 1.21               
NEMP 2.14 DLAND 1.17               
T07 2.07 DH20 1.10               
  Mean VIF 3.47               
Panel C: Hotel Asset Price Elasticity     **  
Variable                    
NOIC 0.0045                 
C −0.0136                 
RM 0.0209                 
EA −0.0087                 
NEMP 0.0059                 
 
 Note: This table reports correlations and elasticity estimates among variables in the property regression models from Table 2.  
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and Smith Travel Research 
**Elasticity only reported for continuous variables because of interpretational difficulty 
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Table 4. Two-stage ls results, all hotels. 
Dependent variable  ln(P) 
Right side variable label Name Coefficient z 
ln(NOIC) City NOI 0.2239* 7.74 
ln(C) Capitalization Rate −0.5195* −7.66 
RM Number of Rooms 0.0006 2.28 
   Effective Age at Date of Sale −0.0079* −2.46 
    Effective Age Squared 0.0001 1.42 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees 0.0001* 6.59 
DCBD CBD Location 0.3222* 4.74 
DLAND Landmark Hotel 0.3641* 3.36 
DH20 Water Location 0.4014* 6.27 
DRENO Recently Renovated 0.0801 1.20 
UUPS Upper Upscale Chain Scale −0.3321* −2.93 
UPS Upscale Chain Scale −0.6281* −5.45 
UMID Upper Midscale Chain Scale −0.9133* −7.12 
MID Midscale Chain Scale −0.9454* −7.42 
ECO Economy Chain Scale −1.3349* −10.26 
DREIT REIT Buyer 0.3403* 5.98 
DPORT Portfolio Sale 0.1205* 2.27 
T06 1=Sold in 2006 0.1298* 1.79 
T07 1=Sold in 2007 0.1428* 2.20 
T08 1=Sold in 2008 0.1273* 1.79 
T09 1=Sold in 2009 −0.0678 −0.69 
T10 1=Sold in 2010 −0.1361 −1.65 
  Constant 16.27* 115.24 
N 623   
R2 7991   
RMSE 0.5112   
 
 Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, 
and present value variables on hotel transaction prices with alternative functional forms 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, 
and Smith Travel Research 
 
*Significant at 0.10 or better  
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Table 5. Variation in selected implicit prices, 2005−2010. 
Variable Label Name Implicit price range 
RM Number of Rooms .0009 to .0034 
EA Effective Age at Date of Sale .0015 to .0233 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0004 to .0010 
DCBD CBD Location −.1473 to .4184 
DLAND Landmark Hotel −.0732 to .7520 
DH2O Water Location .1203 to .5331 
DRENO Recently Renovated −.0809 to .7414 
UUPS Upper Upscale Chain Scale −.8167 to −.2766 
UPS Upscale Chain Scale −1.3924 to −.2500 
UMID Upper Midscale Chain Scale −1.6615 to −.7725 
MID Midscale Chain Scale −1.7674 to −.7478 
ECO Economy Chain Scale −2.2282 to −1.9583 
DREIT REIT Buyer .2207 to .6775 
DPORT Portfolio Sale −.0608 to 2108 
  Constant 16.08 to 17.49 
 
 Notes: This table presents the range of implicit prices for selected determinants in a 
single-stage regression only with property-specific variables estimated each year from 
2005−2010. 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, 
and Smith Travel Research. 
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Table 6. One- and two-stage LS results, luxury and upper upscale hotels. 
Stage regression Single Two 
Dependent variable ln(P) ln(P) 
Right side variable label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z 
ln(NOIC) City NOI .2452* 3.47 .3242* 5.30 
ln(C) Capitalization Rate −.7205* −3.90 −.7350* −4.29 
RM Number of Rooms .00016 0.34 .0001 0.26 
   Effective Age at Date of Sale −.0135 −1.66 −.0128 −1.69 
    Effective Age Squared .0001 1.16 .0001 1.09 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0004* 2.70 .0004* 2.92 
DCBD CBD Location .3267* 2.35 .3349* 2.60 
DGATE Gateway City .1503 1.14 N/A N/A 
DLAND Landmark Hotel .2433 1.28 .2802 1.62 
DH2O Water Location .3426* 2.52 .3809* 2.56 
DRENO Recently Renovated .0411 0.37 .0379 0.36 
DREIT REIT Buyer .3241* 2.22 .3122* 2.32 
DPORT Portfolio Sale .0045 0.03 −.0151 −0.11 
T06 1=Sold in 2006 .2038 1.14 .1940 1.16 
T07 1=Sold in 2007 .2904 1.62 .3087* 1.88 
T08 1=Sold in 2008 .2581 1.21 .2766 1.41 
T09 1=Sold in 2009 −.1939 −0.74 −.1742 −0.72 
T10 1=Sold in 2010 −.1431 −0.69 −.1097 −0.58 
  Constant 15.82* 72.33 15.73* 77.14 
      
      
   RMSE 
 
Adjusted 
Root Mean Square Error 
 
.6020 
.6023 
 
 
 
 
.6479 
.5644 
 
 
 
 
 Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, 
and present value variables on luxury and upper upscale hotel transaction prices using both single- 
and two-stage models 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and 
Smith Travel Research 
 
*Significant at .10 or better 
DETERMINANTS OF HOTEL PROPERTY PRICES  40 
 
Table 7. One- and two-stage LS results, upscale and upper midscale hotels. 
Stage regression Single Two 
Dependent variable ln(P) ln(P) 
Right side variable label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z 
ln(NOIC) City NOI .2127* 4.50 .3081* 7.82 
ln(C) Capitalization Rate −.5563* −3.60 −.5799* −3.88 
RM Number of Rooms .0001 0.00 −.0002 −0.27 
   Effective Age at Date of Sale −.0120* −2.29 −.0118* −2.32 
    Effective Age Squared .0001* 2.04 .0001* 2.10 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees .0003* 2.69 .0003* 2.70 
DCBD CBD Location .4802* 4.31 .5001* 4.65 
DGATE Gateway City .2029* 2.38 N/A N/A 
DLAND Landmark Hotel .3669* 1.86 .3649* 1.90 
DH2O Water Location .6263* 6.18 .6389* 6.51 
DRENO Recently Renovated .2232* 1.77 .2195* 1.80 
DREIT REIT Buyer .3930* 4.64 .3812* 4.67 
DPORT Portfolio Sale .1539* 1.93 .1403* 1.82 
T06 1=Sold in 2006 .1874 1.65 .1569 1.42 
T07 1=Sold in 2007 .1539 1.51 .1310 1.32 
T08 1=Sold in 2008 .0878 0.80 .0656 0.61 
T09 1=Sold in 2009 .1526 0.86 .1450 0.84 
T10 1=Sold in 2010 −.0454 −0.35 −.0917 −0.73 
  Constant 15.48 116.7
8 
15.49* 121.23 
      
      
   RMSE 
 
Adjusted 
Root Mean Square Error 
 
.5911 
.5215 
 
 
 
 
.6094 
.5087 
 
 
 
 
 Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, 
and present value variables on upscale and upper midscale hotel transaction prices using both single- 
and two-stage models 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and 
Smith Travel Research 
 
*Significant at .10 or better 
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Table 8. One- and two-stage LS results, midscale and economy hotels. 
Stage regression Single Two 
Dependent variable ln(P) ln(P) 
Right side variable label Name Coefficient t Coefficient z 
ln(NOIC) City NOI 0.0424 0.66 0.1750* 3.23 
ln(C) Capitalization Rate −0.5013* −3.13 − 0.5185* −3.36 
RM Number of Rooms −0.0002 −0.14 −0.0005 −0.38 
   Effective Age at Date of Sale −0.0112* −2.29 −0.0105* −2.25 
    Effective Age Squared 0.00002 0.29 0.00002 0.34 
NEMP 3M Number of Employees 0.0005* 4.40 0.0005* 4.35 
DCBD CBD Location 0.1665 1.23 0.1987 1.53 
DGATE Gateway City 0.1952* 2.33 N/A N/A 
DLAND Landmark Hotel −0.0811 −0.23 −0.0521 −0.16 
DH2O Water Location 0.1361 1.03 0.1329 1.04 
DRENO Recently Renovated −0.0807 −0.51 −0.0940 −0.61 
DREIT REIT Buyer 0.5230* 4.90 0.5066* 4.92 
DPORT Portfolio Sale 0.2067* 2.34 0.2185* 2.56 
T06 1=Sold in 2006 0.1173 0.91 0.0462 0.37 
T07 1=Sold in 2007 0.0012 0.01 −0.0461 −0.46 
T08 1=Sold in 2008 0.1278 1.13 0.0611 0.56 
T09 1=Sold in 2009 −0.1335 −0.92 −0.1748 −1.24 
T10 1=Sold in 2010 −0.1659 −1.09 −0.2042 −1.39 
  Constant 15.45* 97.91 15.49* 102.28 
      
      
   RMSE 
 
Adjusted 
Root Mean Square Error 
 
0.5607 
0.4734 
 
 
 
 
0.5824 
0.4606 
 
 
 
 
 Note: This table presents the results from regressing property characteristics, date-of-sale, 
and present value variables on midscale and economy hotel transaction prices using both single- and 
two-stage models. 
 Sources: CoStar, Moodys Analytics, PKF Hospitality Research, Real Capital Analytics, and 
Smith Travel Research. 
 
*Significant at .10 or better 
